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Systemic Risk and Financial Innovation:  Towards a “Unified” Approach
* 
 
Henry T. C. Hu 
I.  Introduction 
 
  Three econometricians were on a hunting trip in the wilds of Canada.  It was getting 
around lunchtime, and they were getting hungry. 
 
  The first econometrician shoots, but misses, one meter to the left. 
 
  The second econometrician shoots, but misses, one meter to the left. 
 
  The third econometrician doesn’t shoot at all, but shouts “We got it!  We got it!”
1 
 
  It can be difficult to come up with a good model, much less a model that actually puts 
food on the table.  This is certainly so with coming up with good models relating to “systemic 
risk,” a widely-used term that remains resistant to well-accepted operational meaning.
2  Given 
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1  See, e.g., http://orion.it.luc.edu/~twren/econjoke.htm.  
 
2  The International Monetary Fund has noted that:  
 
“Systemic risk” is a term that is widely used, but is difficult to define and quantify.  Indeed, it   2
this foundational looseness, the quantification of systemic risk – the theme of this conference – is 
a daunting task indeed.  A better understanding of the relationship between systemic risk and 
modern financial innovation may facilitate the task. 
 
  Here, there is an overarching question:  what is the proper approach for understanding 
this critical relationship?  This keynote address revolves around that question.  I do so almost 
exclusively from the narrow perspective of the past writings of an academic who had been 
peering through the window of the candy store.  Then, very briefly, I do so from the perspective 
of someone who had been let into that store, and become a government regulator. 
 
  I make two basic claims.  First, the approach must fully consider the underlying process 
of modern financial innovation through which new financial products and strategies are invented, 
introduced to the marketplace, and diffused.  The process has significance independent of the 
specific products and strategies.  
 
Second, the approach must be highly eclectic in nature, in terms of academic disciplines 
and in terms of “local knowledge” of marketplace realities.  The academic disciplines of 
economics and finance may offer the central theoretical insights, but other disciplines, such as 
law and psychology, as well as cross-fertilization across disciplines can be surprisingly 
informative.  Academic disciplines, no matter the range and the cross-fertilization, may fail to 
provide proper directions.  Indeed, the baselines may have become obsolete.  In financial 
innovation, local knowledge, an understanding of actual marketplace practices and institutions, 
may shed light on the limitations of academic learning and guide that learning along more 
promising paths.   
 
In short, the approach must be highly inclusive – one that comprehends the underlying 
innovation process and an eclecticism as to academic and local knowledge.  There is need for 
what can be characterized as a “unified” approach. 
                                                                                                                                                             
is often viewed as a phenomenon that is there “when we see it,” reflecting a sense of a broadbased 
breakdown in the functioning of the financial system, which is normally realized, ex 
post, by a large number of failures of FIs (usually banks).  Similarly, a systemic episode may 
simply be seen as an extremely acute case of financial instability, even though the degree and 
severity of financial stress has proven difficult, if not impossible, to measure.  Systemic risk is also 
defined by the breadth of its reach across institutions, markets, and countries. 
 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT - RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISK, April 2009, at 116; cf. Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and 
Systemic Risk:  Netting, Collateral, and Closeout, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper 2005-03, at 16 
(May 10, 2005) (stating that “[n]o single generally-agreed definition of what constitutes systemic risk exists.”)  
Recently, Billioi, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon referred to systemic risk as: 
 
A concept originally intended to describe bank runs and currency crises, but which now applies to any 
broad-based breakdown in the financial system.  Systemic risk can be realized as a series of correlated 
defaults among financial institutions, occurring over a short time span and triggering a withdrawal of 
liquidity and widespread loss of confidence in the financial system as a whole. 
 
Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, and Loriana Pelizzon, Measuring Systemic Risk in the Finance and 
Insurance Sectors (Draft of March 10, 2010). 
   3
 
I use some of my academic writings to illustrate such an unified approach in relation to 
financial innovation and systemic risk.  First,  the innovation process itself can have significance 
for the nature of the regulatory response to the systemic risks posed by new financial products 
and strategies.    For instance, the innovation process can quickly overwhelm the classification-
based, “cubbyhole” technique so commonly used in law and regulation, including as was used in 
the pioneering 1988 international response to the systemic risks posed by the derivatives 
revolution.  (1989, 1991, and 1993:  Section II(A))   
 
Second, the unified approach can contribute to a richer understanding of the financial 
innovation process, and the systemic risks that can arise from the process.  This unified 
approach, for instance, long ago yielded reasons to believe that big, “sophisticated” financial 
institutions would take excessive risks and make other mistakes as to derivatives and other 
complex financial products.  Knowledge eclecticism suggested that roles played by such factors 
as the “inappropriability” of the innovation process, incentive structure, cognitive biases, and the 
peculiar nature of “financial science.”  (1993:  Section II(B))   
 
Third, one particular type of innovation process—“decoupling”—has put stress on the 
foundational architecture of corporate governance and “debt governance.”  This new 
phenomenon has consequences for corporations, individual and corporate borrowers, and for the 
stability of the financial system at large.  (2006-2009:  Section II(C)). 
 
  I conclude this address with a few, very brief comments on my current role.  In 
September 2009, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro appointed me 
the inaugural Director of the “Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation.”  The first 
new Division at the SEC in nearly four decades, “Risk Fin” was created to provide sophisticated, 
interdisciplinary analysis across the entire spectrum SEC activities..  This fresh interdisciplinary 
approach, and the new academic and market skill-sets Risk Fin brought in, may have proven 
especially significant in helping the SEC respond to, and implement the landmark Congressional 
legislation that finally brought OTC derivatives squarely into the regulatory fold.  (Section III) 
 
 
II.  Academia:  The Unified Approach and Systemic Risk 
 
  A.  The Innovation Process and the Use of Classifications in Law and Regulation (1989, 
1991, 1993, and 1995) 
 
  The usual approach to addressing regulatory matters relating to financial innovation is to 
look at specific new financial products.  Beginning in 1989, I have emphasized that modern 
financial innovation consists of two components:  the products, and the underlying process of 
financial innovation through which such products and strategies are invented, introduced to the 
marketplace, and diffused.
3  At its most impressive, the process has many of the characteristics 
commonly associated with science-based industries like biotechnology.  There is heavy reliance 
                                                 
 
3  Henry T. C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory 
Paradigm, 138 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 333 (1989).    4
on Ph.D.’s with highly quantitative backgrounds – called “quants,” “lightbulb heads,” “rocket 
scientists,” or something entirely different when there are big losses – and a reliance on formal 
models laden with incomprehensible Greek letters.  The process is also institutionalized, central 
to the competition among major financial institutions.  Tinkering by generalist bankers and the 
occasional introduction of new financial products have given way. 
 
In 1989, the path-breaking (first) Basel Accord governing the capital adequacy of major 
banks worldwide had just been adopted.  Currency and interest rate swaps, the first OTC 
derivatives, had emerged about a decade earlier and bank exposure to such derivatives was rising 
rapidly.  Motivated in large part by the systemic risks posed by such exposure, the Basel Accord 
relied on the classification-based technique so characteristic of regulation and law.  Regulators, 
at least in the first instance, decide mechanistically the capital required to be allocated to any 
given derivative by applying simple rules to a limited number of facts.  The amount of capital 
presumptively required on account of a swap is simply determined by whether it is an interest 
rate or a currency swap, its maturity, and its notional amount. 
 
That 1989 article, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the 
Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm suggested that this “cubbyhole” approach was bound to 
fail in the face of the modern process of financial innovation.  As with any classification-based 
system, there will be an incentive to “walk the line,” to try to use the rules to one’s own 
advantage.  But the financial innovation process itself causes a far more fundamental problem – 
current administrative and political realities prevented a more complex classification system and 
since the diversity of financial products will grow as financial innovation continues, the system 
will assign improper regulatory prices with increasing frequency.  The institutionalization of 
change, as well as the operation of a highly dynamic marketplace, will cause serious problems of 
regulatory obsolescence. 
 
In theory, updating the cubbyholes in response to changing products was the answer.  
However, Regulatory Paradigm pointed out numerous obstacles, including the extraordinary 
informational asymmetry between regulators and derivatives dealers.  Among other things, banks 
generally may develop an OTC derivative without any clearance from or registration with 
banking authorities:  a regulator may not even be aware of the existence of a swap, much less 
how to model its risk characteristics. 
 
To address this informational asymmetry, in a 1993 article (and in testimony before the 
Senate Banking Committee in June 2009, prior to arrival at the SEC), I suggested the creation of 
a public informational clearinghouse relating to OTC derivatives with systematic data collection 
and analytical responsibilities.
4  
   Due in large part to the lobbying efforts of the Committee to 
Establish the National Institute of Finance, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), signed on July 21, 2010, provides for the creation of an 
                                                 
 
4  See Henry T. C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives:  The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 Yale Law Journal 1457, 1503-1508 (1993) [hereinafter Hu, Misunderstood 
Derivatives]; Henry T. C. Hu, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and The Regulation of OTC Derivatives 
– OTC Derivatives:  Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and Reduce Risks, U.S. Senate Banking 
Committee – Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment (June 21, 2009) (testimony) [hereinafter Hu, 
June 2009 Senate Testimony]   5
“Office of Financial Research” within the Treasury Department with various informational 
clearinghouse and other responsibilities.
5 
 
The same financial innovation process that undermined the cubbyhole approach in the 
bank regulatory context can undermine other areas of law.  For instance, noted scholars and 
practitioners showed the applicability of this process-cubbyhole analysis to tax law.
6  And in a 
1991 article, I showed how its applicability to corporate law, in particular the difficulties posed 




The concluding paragraph of Regulatory Paradigm article argued: 
 
Financial regulators must develop a mechanism to deal explicitly with this 
underlying process.  The difficulties involved in devising such a mechanism are 
daunting.  A brief overview of one of the simplest, most incremental of possible 
mechanisms suggests the dimensions of the task.  Unless we begin now to 
intensify our efforts, incremental changes may ultimately prove insufficient to 
ensure the continued stability of the world financial system. 
 
It is now more than 20 years after the initial Basel Accord.  The challenges identified in 
1989 article remain.  In discussing reform proposals advanced in 2010, The Economist stated as 
follows: 
 
The proposals have already been dubbed “Basel 3” – which tells you regulators 
have been here twice before.  Alas, the record of bank capital rules is crushingly 
bad.  The Basel regime (European and American banks use either version 1 or 2) 
represents a monumental, decades-long effort at perfection, with minimal capital 




B.  Understanding the Innovation Process and Its Role in Systemic Risk: How 
Inappropriability, Cognitive Biases, Incentive Structures, and the Peculiarities of 
Financial “Science” Contribute to Derivatives Mistakes (1993)   
 
                                                 
 
5  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 151-153 (2010).  Although said Committee was kind enough to include 
Misunderstood Derivatives and the June 2009 Senate Testimony in the listing of “Documents and Readings” on the 
Committee’s website, the author was never affiliated with the Committee and was not involved in its lobbying 
efforts.  See Committee to Establish the National Institute of Finance - CE-NIF Documents, http://www.ce-
nif.org/background-readings. 
 
6  See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products:  a Conceptual Framework, 46 Stanford Law Review 569, 
570 n. 2 (1994). 
 
7  Henry T. C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of 
Shareholder Welfare, 69 Texas Law Review 1273, 1292-1300, 1311-12 (1991). 
 
8  Base camp Basel:  Reforming banking, Economist, January 23, 2010.   6
  Financial institutions focused solely on shareholder interests would generally take on 
more risk than would be socially optimal.  At least in the past, governments typically constrained 
risk-taking at financial institutions, but not elsewhere.  The primary motivation has, of course, 
been over the especially-large negative externalities associated with financial institutions. 
 
In 1993, I suggested that much more than a gap between shareholder- and social-
optimality would likely be involved when it came to financial institution risk-taking with respect 
to derivatives.  In Misunderstood Derivatives:  The Causes of Informational Failure and the 
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism,
9 I suggested that a repeated pattern of outright mistakes, 
harmful to shareholders and societies alike, was likely to occur even at major, presumptively 
“sophisticated” entities. 
 
Why?  From the standpoint of psychology, I discussed how cognitive biases might 
explain underproduction of information relevant to certain kinds of risks, especially legal ones.  
From the standpoints of marketplace realities and principal-agency theory, I showed how the 
same theories that would normally imply excessive managerial aversion to risk-taking could, 
when applied to the OTC derivatives context, lead to risk-taking excessive even from the 
standpoint of diversified shareholders.  From the standpoint of the law and economics of 
technological change, I applied "inappropriability" and other theories pertaining to commercial 
scientific research to illuminate allocative problems arising from the financial innovation 
production process.  From the standpoint of traditional scientific norms, I showed how 
departures of financial “science” from such norms undermined decision-making.  I offered some 
possible responses.  
 
I argued that one factor contributing to mistakes is cognitive bias in the derivatives 
modeling process.  Humans often rely on cognitive shortcuts to solve complex problems.  
Sometimes these shortcuts are irrational. 
 
For instance, one of the cognitive biases undermining derivatives models is the tendency 
to ignore low probability-catastrophic events.
10  Psychologists theorize that individuals do not 
worry about an event unless the probability of the event is perceived to be above some critical 
threshold.  The effect may be caused by individuals’ inability to comprehend and evaluate 
extreme probabilities, or by a lack of any direct experience.  This effect manifests itself in 
attitudes towards tornadoes, safety belts, and earthquake insurance.   
 
The 1993 article indicated that in the derivatives context, rocket scientists are sometimes 
affirmatively encouraged, as a matter of model design, to ignore low probability states of the 
world.  I also showed how this tendency, along with other cognitive biases, may cause risks of a 
legal nature to be ignored.  Rocket scientists are expert in all manner of financial risks and their 
quantification.  Law itself is unfamiliar turf, and no rich tradition of incorporating legal risks into 
                                                 
 
9  Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 4. 
 
10  Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 4, at 1487-1492.  This 1993 discussion of this cognitive bias and its 
applicability to finance substantially pre-dated writings of the related matter of “black swans.”    7
derivatives modeling exists.  Under such circumstances, “expert” and “availability” effects are 
given a free hand to inhibit proper consideration of legal risks. 
 
The foregoing relates to irrational behavior in connection with the innovation process that 
can contribute to decision-making errors.  Behavior that is fully rational on the part of the 
humans involved in the process—responding to the incentive structure actually in the 
marketplace—contributes as well.  
 
In the derivatives industry, the incentive structure can be highly asymmetric.
11  True 
success—or the perception by superiors of success—can lead to enormous wealth.  Failure or 
perceived failure may normally result, at most, in job and reputational losses.  Thus, there may 
be serious temptations for the rocket scientist to emphasize the rewards and downplay the risks 
of particular derivatives activities to superiors, especially since the superiors may sometimes not 
be as financially sophisticated (and loathe to admit this).  Moreover, the material risk exposures 
on certain derivatives can sometimes occur years after entering into the transaction.  Given the 
turnover in the derivatives industry, the “negatives” may arise long after the rocket scientist is 
gone.  The rocket scientist may have an especially short-term view of the risks and returns of his 
activities.  Principal-agent issues abound, here, however, leading to too much risk-taking from 
the standpoint of diversified shareholders, rather than too little, as may be the general case in 
normal situations. 
 
The 1993 article also considered the inability to capture—to fully “appropriate” the 
benefits of their financial research and development.
12  The nature of the intellectual property 
law regime, and related legal and marketplace factors, effectively precluded this.  This 
“inappropriability” could lead to the failure to devote enough resources to fully understand the 
risks and returns of these products.   
 
More importantly, the peculiar nature of financial “science” at the heart of the innovation 
process also contributes to difficulties, for both financial institutions themselves as well as for 
regulators.
13  This matter goes beyond the “precisely wrong” tendency of financial science 
exactly when it may matter most:  in chaotic market conditions, the liquidity and other 
assumptions underlying the models do not hold.     
 
Among other things, financial science departs radically from violations of the traditional 
scientific norm of “universalism.”  This raises profound questions as to the “true” value of 
complex financial products.  Robert K. Merton, the great sociologist, suggested that 
“universalism” is that the truth of claims should be determined through the application of 
impersonal criteria without regard to the source’s personal, social, or other attributes.  As an 
example, Merton stated that “The Haber process cannot be invalidated by a Nuremberg decree 
nor can an Anglophobe repeal the law of gravitation.” 
                                                 
 
11  Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 4, at 1492-94 and 1512-13. 
 
12  Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 4, at 1481-1487.  
 
13  Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note5, at 1476-1481 and 1496-1502.  Cf. Andrew W. Lo and Mark T. 
Mueller, WARNING:  Physics Envy May Be Hazardous To Your Wealth! (Draft of March 19, 2010).      8
 
Misunderstood Derivatives suggested that the univeralism imperative did not entirely 
apply to financial science.  The predictive power of any model depends on who is doing the 
thinking and on what others actually think of the thinker.  For instance: 
 
If a derivatives dealer dominates the market for a given derivative thinks a particular 
model is suitable for valuing that derivative, then his identity is relevant.  Even if the 
model is seriously flawed as a theoretical matter, his importance alone makes the model 
at least temporarily relevant.  Moreover, should the dealer decide to withdraw from the 
market for that derivative, liquidity may dry up and the pure “theoretical” value may be 
particularly irrelevant.  There is no Mertonian universalism here.  The impact of this is 
likely to be especially severe as to the more arcane instruments and products dominated 
by a few dealers and in chaotic market conditions.
14 
 
In view of my present role at the SEC, I will only sketch in very broad terms some of the 
ways in which the 1993 article may relate to, or explain, some subsequent developments in the 
real world.  Others have been kind enough to intimate that the overarching thesis that 
“sophisticated” capital market participants were prone to make mistakes as to derivatives 
foreshadowed the 1998 collapse of Long Term Capital Management
15 and matters associated 
with the current global financial crisis, including the near-collapse of the American International 
Group in 2008.
16  And matters like the inappropriability problem may be a factor in the excessive 
reliance on credit ratings in securitizations and inadequate due diligence.
17  Cognitive biases such 
as the tendency to ignore low probability/catastrophic events appear to have been demonstrated 
repeatedly during the global financial crisis.  Departures from Mertonian universalism may help 
make more understandable current controversies over distinctions among mark-to-market, mark-
to-model, and mark-to-myth.
18  Recently, the points made in the incentive structure analysis in 
Misunderstood Derivatives were characterized as “hardly mainstream” in 1993, but “[n]ow . . . 
arguably define the ground on which the debate takes place.”
19  Concerns over banker incentive 
                                                 
 
14  Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 4, at 1501. 
 
15  Roger Lowenstein was kind enough to use an extract from Misunderstood Derivatives as the epigraph to his 
classic book, WHEN GENIUS FAILED:  THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000). 
 
16  See, e.g., Kara Scannell, At SEC, Scholar Who Saw It Coming, Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2010, at C1 
[hereinafter Scannell, Scholar].  For a brief, pre-SEC analysis of the possible applicability of cognitive bias and 
other factors identified in Misunderstood Derivatives might apply to AIG, see Hu, June 2009 Senate Testimony, 
supra note 5. 
 
17  For a pre-SEC analysis of this, see Hu, June 2009 Senate Testimony, supra note 5.  
 
18  As to the distinctions, see, e.g., Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007-2008:  A Discussion of the Background, 
Market Reactions, and Policy Responses, Review – Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, September/October 2008; 
Shyam Sunder, IFRS and the Accounting Consensus, Accounting Horizons, March 2009.  
 
19  Patrick Bolton, Bruce Kogut, and Werner Puschra, Governance, Executive Compensation, and Excessive Risk in 
the Financial Services Industry - Executive Summary, at page 5 (research symposium presented by the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung and the Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Center at Columbia Business School on May 28, 2010),   9
structures have motivated disclosure and substantive regulatory responses worldwide over the 
past year, including in the Dodd-Frank Act.   
 
C.  The “Decoupling” Process, the Foundational Architecture of Corporate Governance  
and “Debt Governance,”  and Systemic Risk (2006-2009) 
 
The foundational architecture of corporate law and finance—“equity” and “debt”—used 
to be clear: 
 
Ownership of equity conveyed a package of economic rights, voting 
rights, and other rights.  Such ownership also carried with it various obligations, 
such as disclosure obligations. 
 
Similarly, ownership of debt conveyed a package of rights and obligations.  
A holder of debt had, for instance, economic rights (such as the right to principal 
and interest), the control rights given by contract (such as in the loan agreement or 
the bond indenture), and other legal rights (such as those flowing from 
bankruptcy, corporate, and securities law). 
 
That is, classic understandings of “equity” and “debt” contemplated bundled packages of 
rights and obligations. 
 
In a series of articles as to which I was the lead or sole author, I suggested that a new 
“decoupling” process had emerged.  Because of rocket scientists, hedge funds, and other factors, 
one can easily break up these equity and debt packages, quickly and on a massive scale.  And 
beyond “equity decoupling” and “debt decoupling,” there could also be “hybrid decoupling” 
across equity and debt categories.
20  
 
  Consider, first, the decoupling process on the equity side, the simplest of these three basic 
types, and the subject of the initial May 2006 article.
21  And I will just just focus on one example 
of equity decoupling, the example the article dubbed “empty voting.”  I leave aside other 
examples of equity decoupling, including an example dubbed “hidden (morphable) ownership.”
22 
                                                 
 
20  See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk 
Implications, 14 European Financial Management 663-709 (September 2008) (nearly-final draft available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084075) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling].   
 
21  Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 
Southern California Law Review 811-908 (May 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=904004 [hereinafter 
Hu & Black, Empty Voting I].  Subsequent articles focusing on the equity decoupling side include:  Henry T. C. Hu 
& Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 343-367 (2007) (nearly final draft 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=874098); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and 
Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 625-739 (January 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030721 [hereinafter, Hu & Black, Empty Voting II]  
 
22  This hidden (morphable) ownership issue was first litigated in the U.S. in CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment 
Fund Management, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Hedge Funds Can Vote at CSX   10
 
  Corporate governance, at almost all companies, is based on a proportional relationship 
between the number of shares held and shareholder voting rights.  In other words, one share-one 
vote.  All existing theories of corporate governance are based on this coupling of economic 
interest and voting power. 
 
  Today, however, the voting rights you have no longer needs to depend on the economic 
stake you have.  There is a variety of techniques for accomplishing this.
23  One way is to simply 
buy a lot of shares, and then hedge that exposure.  You can buy 1,000,000 shares, and thus have 
a 1,000,000 votes.  Simultaneously, you can buy lots of put options.  You still have 1,000,000 
votes, but you may only have the economic equivalent of, say, 200,000 shares.  This type of 




  Or consider an extreme type of empty voter.  If you buy enough put options, you may 
actually have a negative economic interest.  You could literally have a situation where the person 
who holds the highest number of votes could actually have a negative economic interest.  That 
person would not use his votes as a monitoring device to make sure that the company does well, 
but to try to make that the company does badly.  He would want to vote for Inspector Clouseau 
or Maxwell Smart to the board. 
  
The decoupling process on the debt side is more directly related to systemic risk matters 
that are the focus of this conference.
25  Let’s begin with debt decoupling in the context of 
individual corporate borrowers.   
 
Here the issues correspond to those on the equity decoupling side.  On the equity 
decoupling side, I just referred to an “empty voter.”  That is, a shareholder by, for instance, 
buying equity derivatives, can have control rights – the vote – and yet have relatively little or no 
economic exposure. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
Meeting, New York Times, June 12, 2008, at C1.  As to examples of types of equity decoupling other than empty 
voting and hidden (morphable) ownership, see Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 22, at Part V.     
 
23  For instance, in the United Kingdom, Laxey, a hedge fund used the stock lending market to engage in empty 
voting in relation to British Land.  See Hu & Black, Empty Voting I, supra note 21; Kara Scannell, How Borrowed 
Shares Swing Votes, Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2007, at A1. 
 
24  Although perhaps counterintuitive, as the decoupling articles cited in note 21 supra suggest, empty voting can, 
under certain circumstances, improve corporate governance. 
 
25  Some of the key articles that address decoupling on the debt side are:  Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 Columbia Law Review 1321-1403 (October 2007); 
Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 21; Hu & Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 20; Henry T. C. 
Hu, ‘Empty Creditors’ and the Crisis – How Goldman’s $7 billion was not ‘material,’ Wall Street Journal, April 
10, 2009, at A13, online version available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123933166470307811.html [hereinfter 
Hu, Empty Creditors and the Crisis]   11
  Similarly, a creditor, by buying credit derivatives, can have control rights and also have 
little or no economic exposure.  In August 2007, I coined the term “empty creditor” to refer to 
this scenario. 
 
  One simple way of becoming an empty creditor is to take the long side of a credit default 
swap.  But there are other “coupled assets” that the creditor could use.  For instance, it could 
engage in strategies involving a company’s shares (such as buying put options on the shares or 
taking the short side of equity swaps) or use “related non-host asset” strategies (such as holding 
long or short positions in the shares or the debt of the company’s competitors). 
 
  On the equity side, one can have an empty voter-with-a-negative-economic-interest,  
Similarly, on the debt side, creditors can also have control and legal rights, and yet net negative 
economic exposure to a firm’s credit risk.  Thus, a creditor could hold $100 million in loans or 
bonds, but have a credit default swap in the tional amount of $200 million. 
 
  What might some of the systemic risk effects be?  Let me discuss a few.  Both loan 
agreements as well as bankruptcy laws are premised on the assumption that creditors have an 
economic interest in the company’s success and will behave accordingly.  Thus, a borrower may 
anticipate that its creditor may well agree to waive certain debt covenants because of the 
creditor’s interest in the borrower’s survival. 
 
  But empty creditors may act in ways inconsistent with these assumptions.  A creditor 
with a negative economic ownership may have incentives that correspond to their equity 
counterparts.  These creditors may seek to reduce the value of the debt class they hold as a 
formal matter.  These creditors may oppose an out-of-court restructuring because it might prefer 
that the company fail (and thus trigger payments on its credit default swap positions).  Even a 
creditor with zero, rather than negative, economic ownership may want a bankruptcy filing 
because such a filing may trigger an immediate contractual payoff in its credit default swap 
position. 
 
  Under such circumstances, the weakened incentives to help a debtor stay out of 
bankruptcy may contribute to systemic risk.  This is to be distinguished from the issue of the 
overall impact of credit default swaps on the lending market or on systemic risk, matters beyond 
the intended scope of the analysis. 
 
  And if “empty crediting” is hidden, the problem gets worse.  There is a problem of 
“hidden non-ownership” or “hidden non-interest.”  Outside of bankruptcy, a struggling company 
is in the dark as to the true incentives of his lender.  And in bankruptcy, complications can arise 
as well.  Problems with the efficient resolution of companies in bankruptcies can sometimes pose 
systemic risk concerns. 
 
  In sum, debt decoupling, both in its substantive and disclosure aspects, can thus 
undermine what one can refer to as “debt governance”—the relationship between creditors and 
debtors, both in and outside of bankruptcy proceedings.  This can raise systemic risk concerns. 
   12
Consider, for instance, the possibility of an empty creditor issue having occurred in 
connection with one of the signal events of the current global financial crisis – the bailout of the 
American International Group. 
 
In an April 2009 Wall Street Journal op-ed, written prior to my arrival at the SEC,
26 I 
pointed to what may be referred to as The Curious Incident of the Bank That Didn’t Bark.  On 
September 16, 2008, as AIG was being bailed out, Goldman Sachs said its exposure to AIG was 
“not material.”  But on March 15, 2009, AIG disclosed that it had turned over to Goldman $7 
billion of the federal bailout funds that AIG received. 
 
The op-ed suggested that one reason Goldman Sachs did not express alarm in September 
it that it was an empty creditor.  Having hedged its economic exposure to AIG with credit default 
swaps from “large financial institutions,” Goldman had lessened concerns over the fate of AIG.  
Yet Goldman had control rights associated with the contracts that it had entered into with AIG 
(including rights to demand collateral).  Perhaps not surprisingly, Goldman was apparently 
aggressive in calling for collateral from AIG—nothwithstanding the possible impact on AIG’s 
solvency and the consequences for systemic risk.
27 
 
Recently, both Sheila Bair, the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
and Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodity Futures and Trading Commission Chairman 
explicitly raised concerns as to empty creditor incentives.
28  In contrast, the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association is more skeptical. 
                                                 
 
26  Hu, Empty Creditors and the Crisis, supra note 25.  I emphasize that I have not here in any way attempted to 
update the analysis in the op-ed.  I do not here mean to suggest in any way the accuracy of the April 2009 op-ed, or 
other matters relating to the Goldman-AIG relationship, including subsequent reports such as Gretchen Morgenson 
and Louise Story, Quiet Conflict With Goldman Helped Push A.I.G. to Precipice – Questions of Bank’s Role in Fall 
of Insurer, New York Times, February 7, 2010, at A1.   
 
27  I did not in any way suggest that Goldman did anything improper, and noted that Goldman had obligations to its 
own shareholders. 
 
28  Chairman Bair stated: 
 
Well, I think this is, the empty creditor issue.  . . . What kind of skewed incentives does the CDS market, 
the credit default swap market in particular, have [on] creditors of institutions when they start to get into 
trouble?  Traditionally, if an institution starts to get into trouble, their creditors will work with them to 
restructure the debt, to stabilize them, to keep them out of bankruptcy. 
 
But if you have a large CDS position, even you might have some debt exposure, if you’re to make more on 
our CDS if the institution fails, it can create very skewed incentives. 
 
Testimony of Sheila Bair, Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – Part I, Federal News Service (Jan. 
14, 2010). 
 
Chairman Gensler stated: 
 
Bondholders and creditors who have CDS protection that exceeds their actual credit exposure may thus 
benefit more from the underlying company’s bankruptcy than if the underlying company succeeds.  These   13
 
  The foregoing debt decoupling discussion has related to the single borrower situation.   
 
But the debt decoupling process relating to the multiple borrower context can raise 
systemic risk concerns.  Consider the securitization process.  By 2008, the moral hazard, 
informational asymmetry, modeling risk, and credit ratings agency concerns associated with 
securitization, and the consequent impact on systemic risk, had become familiar.  Associated 
terms such as “skin-in-the-game” came to be commonly used. 
 
  However, at that time, the role of debt decoupling as an additional way securitization 
could contribute to systemic risk was not part of the dialogue.
29  Consider the days before 
securitization.  If a homeowner is having financial difficulties, he can approach his local banker 
– picture Jimmy Stewart in It’s a Wonderful Life – and seek to renegotiate the terms of his 
mortgage.  In many situations, such loan modifications are better both for the borrower and for 
the creditor.  There is a “dynamic” relationship between debtors and creditors, one sensitive to 
changing financial conditions and individual circumstances. 
 
  If, however, a loan has been securitized, such a dynamic “debt governance” system 
becomes difficult.  The servicing agent holds the control rights, but has limited rights to modify 
the loan.  In addition, since servicers typically have almost no ownership stake, they may have 
very little incentive to do so.  The tranche holders usually have decision rights, but the economic 
interests of the tranches can differ widely.  Tranche warfare is inevitable. 
 
Thus the relationship between debtors and creditors may tend to get “frozen”:  re-
adjustments of the relationship between debtors and creditors may be difficult.  If this issue 
involves just one or two debtors and creditors, there are no systemic risk concerns.  But if there 
are thousands of debtors and creditors, the undermining of flexible “debt governance” through 
debt decoupling contributes to systemic risk. 
 
In October 2010, with front page stories on on  problems in mortgage documentation and 
foreclosure nationwide, such loan modification rigidity, conflict of interest, and tranche warfare 
issues are becoming well-known.  What is not clear at time of writing is the precise extent to 
which these problems and issues affect individual financial institutions or contribute to systemic 
risk. 
 
III.  Concluding Thoughts:  Risk Fin, Financial Innovation, and Systemic Risk 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
parties, sometimes called “empty creditors,” might have an incentive to force a company into default or 
bankruptcy. 
 
Gary Gensler, Keynote Address, Markit’s Outlook for OTC Derivatives Markets Confereence (March 9, 2010). 
  
For views of others, see, e.g., CDSs and bankruptcy, Economist, June 20, 2009; David Mengle, The Empty Creditor 
Hypothesis, ISDA Research Notes No. 3 (2009). 
 
29  How the debt decoupling aspects of securitization contributed to systemic risk was first set out in Hu & Black, 
Debt and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 20.    14
The SEC had, for nearly four decades, operated in large part through four Divisions:  the 
Division of Corporation Finance (handling such matters as public offerings), the Division of 
Enforcement (handling such matters as insider trading and fraud cases), the Division of 
Investment Management (handling such matters as mutual funds and closed-end frauds), and the 
Division of Trading and Markets (handling such matters as the stock exchanges and broker-
dealers).  The vast bulk of professional staff at these Divisions, as at the SEC as  a whole, are 
traditional lawyers.  At the initiative of then-Chairman Roderick Hills, the first professional 
economists of the modern era arrived at the SEC in the mid-1970s.  As of August 2009, 
substantially all of the SEC’s economists were in organizational units called the “Office of 
Economic Analysis” (OEA) and the “Office of Risk Assessment” (ORA). 
 
  In September 2009, the SEC created the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial 
Innovation, the first new Division since 1972.  Chairman Schapiro was kind enough to ask me to 
be Risk Fin’s inaugural Director.  Concurrent with its creation, OEA and ORA became 
components of Risk Fin and so all staff at these two units immediately became staff of Risk Fin.  
With Risk Fin’s subsequent adoption of an organizational structure consistent with its broad 
mandate, the OEA and ORA units disappeared, having been fully merged into the Division.  
Shortly afterwards, Risk Fin welcomed all of the financial data processing and analysis experts at 
the SEC’s “Office of Interactive Disclosure.” 
 
  Risk Fin’s core purpose is to provide sophisticated, interdisciplinary analysis across the 
entire spectrum of SEC activities.  In its “think tank” and other roles, Risk Fin is involved in 
policy-making, rule-making, enforcement, and examinations.  Its responsibilities cover three 
broad areas:  risk and economic analysis, strategic research; and financial innovation. 
 
The SEC has long had excellent economists.  But in view of this broad, ambitious 
mandate, Risk Fin needed to add to existing skill sets and deepen the bench.  Risk Fin hired 
individuals who had financial, quantitative, and transactional experience in—i.e., local 
knowledge of—corporate governance, derivatives, risk management, and trading at major hedge 
funds, investment banks, and law firms.  Moreover, Risk Fin hired individuals with advanced 
academic training in additional disciplines, including mathematics.  Some Risk Fin staff had both 
local knowledge and a Ph.D.  Some outside observers appear to have noticed.  The Economist, 
for example, has stated that this new Division is “packed with heavyweight thinkers.”
30 
 
To further cross-fertilization within Risk Fin, collaboration across disciplines and work 
experiences were encouraged.  And, in terms of the SEC as a whole, Chairman Schapiro has 
talked about the Division’s role in “bor[ing] through the silos that for too long have 
compartmentalized and limited the impact of [the SECs] institutional expertise.”
31 
 
                                                 
 
30  Fingers in the dike – What regulators should do now, The Economist, February 13, 2010.  Cf., e.g., Floyd 
Norris, A Window Opens on Pay for Bosses, New York Times, January 15, 2010, at B1; Scannell, Scholar, supra 
note 16.  
 
31  Mary L. Schapiro, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government – House 
Committee on Appropriations (March 17, 2010).    15
Risk Fin has been involved in a wide variety of matters relating to financial innovation 
and systemic risk.  Most notably perhaps, Risk Fin has been actively involved in connection with 
the landmark Congressional efforts to bring the largely unregulated OTC derivatives market into 
the regulatory fold.
32  Though the OTC market only emerged about 30 years ago, at $490 trillion 
dollars in notional amount terms (as of June 2009), the market is no longer a sideshow.  Now that 
the Dodd-Frank Act has passed, Risk Fin has been working closely with others at the SEC in 
trying implement the legislative mandates.  Matters such as clearinghouses for OTC derivatives, 
the regulation of OTC market participants, and hedge fund regulation.are central to the future of 
financial innovation and systemic risk.  
 
Risk Fin has been extensively involved in financial innovation and systemic risk matters 
outside of this derivatives legislation context.  These include efforts relating to the asset-backed 
securities, hedge funds, and money market funds that help make up the “shadow banking 
system” at the root of many current systemic risk concerns.  Its computer, economic, 
quantitative, and local knowledge expertise contributed to analysis of securitization matters, even 
prior to the Dodd-Frank Act.
33  Risk Fin and our SEC colleagues have worked closely with the 
U.K. Financial Services Authority with respect to hedge funds, including as to the gathering and 
sharing of information.
34  Risk Fin has worked with our Division of Investment Management 




Risk Fin has also been involved as to other matters that some believe implicate systemic 
risk issues.  These include pension funding, disclosure, and other issues relating to the state of 
municipal securities markets.
36  Issues relating to high frequency trading and other innovative 
trading strategies have been decidedly more high tech in nature; Risk Fin staff contributed to a 
pertinent “concept release” issued on January 21, 2010
37 and both of the joint CFTC-SEC reports 
issued in the wake of the subsequent May 6
th “flash crash.”  
 
Some financial innovation issues do not have obvious systemic risk implications, but are 
nevertheless important.  Risk Fin has contributed to the SEC’s most comprehensive review of the 
shareholder voting infrastructure in 30 years, especially with respect to the review’s “empty 
                                                 
 
32  See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Testimony Concerning the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market Act of 2009 Before 
the House Committee on Financial Services (October 7, 2009).  
 
33 See, e.g., Asset-Backed Securities, SEC Release No. 33-9117, 2010 SEC Lexis 1493 (May 3, 2010). 
 
34  See, e.g., SEC and UK FSA Hold Fifth Meeting of the SEC-FSA Strategic Dialogue, SEC Press Release 2010-17 
(Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-17.htm  
 
35  See, e.g., Money Market Fund Reform, SEC Release No. IC-29132, 2010 SEC Lexis 462 (Feb. 23, 2010). 
 
36  See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission Field Hearing on The State of the Municipal Securities Market 
(San Francisco, Sept. 21, 2010) (transcripti), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/municipalsecurities/092110transcript.txt. 
 
37  Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, SEC Release 34-61358, 2010 SEC Lexis 334 (Jan. 21, 2010).   16
voting”-related aspects.
38  In the enforcement context, it has worked on such matters as credit 
derivatives-based insider trading litigation.  
 
  Both those in academia and those in government have problems coming up with good 
models.  As an academic, I have only scratched the surface as to the relationship between 
financial innovation and systemic risk.  As a government technocrat, I am enormously 
appreciative of Chairman Schapiro having been kind enough to say that, with Risk Fin, the SEC 




A new path is indeed necessary in approaching issues involving financial innovation and 
systemic risk, in academic thinking as well as in governmental regulation.  Risk Fin is, and 
hopefully will always be, a work in progress, one as dynamic as today’s capital markets. 
 
  Let’s go back to those three hunters in the wilds of Canada.  With either the academic or 
governmental hat on, if you ever hear me shouting, “We got it!  We got it!”, I ask that you 
approach me with the appropriate degree of skepticism. 
 




                                                 
 
38 See, e.g., Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, SEC Release No. 34-62495, 2010 SEC Lexis 2407 (July 22, 
2010); Kara Scannell, SEC Delves into ‘Proxy Plumbing’:  Biggest Review in 30 Years Puts Empty Voting, Adviser 
Conflicts, Other Issues Under the Microscope, Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2010, at C3. 
 
39  Henry T. C. Hu, Inaugural Director of Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation To Return to 
University of Texas, SEC Press Release 2010-226 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-226.htm (on my return to academia in January 2011); Alexander 
Campbell, The Fin man, Risk Magazine, January 2011, at 132.  